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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
BANKS PROSPERED AGAINST THE ODDS. WHY?
Summary
This communication sketches in headlines long term developments in American and European
banking. Contrary to the expectation of both practitioners and theorists in the nineties, has the
role of banks in the economy not diminished but increased. This is demonstrated by the long
term increase of bank credit as a percentage of GDP (resulting in a stronger growth of M2
and 3 than GDP), a growing contribution of bank sector income to GDP, growing employment
(until recently) and a growing share of bank shares in total market capitalisation over the past
three decades until 2004–2006. This growing share may have been induced by a comparatively
superior performance, supported by a relatively high dividend yield, despite a lower-than-average
price-earning ratio. Banks counteracted increased competition and disintermediation tendencies
in their traditional lending business by a progressive involvement in capital markets. They devel-
oped themselves, in several functions, these markets. For this reason the often used distinction
between bank-based and market-based financial systems is less meaningful. Capital markets func-
tion thanks to banks. Even more because a rapidly growing volume of new, unlisted investment
instruments are constructed by banks and traded over their counter. By this development the risk
absorbing and intermediating function of banks – being their basic function in the financial sys-
tem – is also accentuated. The professional capability of leading banks to fulfil this basic function
has in the current “sub prime” crisis come under severe criticism.
Key words: bank assets/M3, bank/market-based systems, bank performance, banks’ weight in
market capitalisation, risk transformation, information asymmetry, bank crisis
JEL Code(s): G15, G20, G21
1 INTRODUCTION
Bank experts – both practitioners and theorists – have long suggested that
the worldwide rise of a capital market based financial system should diminish
the role of banks. It was even predicted that the big commercial banks would
become extinct.1 Are they nearing that stage? On the contrary. If one takes
a longer term view it is clear that, despite the recent, much publicity draw-
ing sub prime crisis which has hurt the stock exchange value of large banks
1 See e.g. Canals (1997): “The decline in the banks’ results has led many managers and
industry analysts to wonder about the banks’ future. In the United States some authors have
dared to ask whether banking is dead” (p. 328). See also (Llewellyn 1999, Chap. 3: “Are banks
in decline?”).
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in the U.S. and Europe dramatically, the banking industry at large was and
still is basically flourishing. This is demonstrated by the share of bank stock
in the total equity market capitalisation which was distinctly increasing until
2004–2006. The economic and financial importance of banks has not lost but
gained weight in the worldwide evolution from a bank based towards a mar-
ket based financial system. This seems paradoxical and is not explained by the
current, generally accepted paradigm of banking which defines the function
of banks as information asymmetries solving, intermediating agents between
savers and real investors (Freixas and Rochet 1997; Merton and Bodie 1995).
In view of the information technology driven expansion of public capital mar-
kets this paradigm would rather support the extinction scenario of banks.
Evidently, banks perform other activities and create more value for stakehold-
ers than bank theorists up to now observe. Further to their traditional role as
depository and lending institution banks are redirecting their business more
towards facilitation and promotion of investment and financing on capital
markets, both public and private. They strongly promote the flow of funds
on these markets through the innovation and sale of new investment and risk
instruments and through the promotion of new financing techniques.
The purpose of this communication is to sketch in headlines the growing
and evolving role of banks in the economy, to explain their evolution by their
progressive involvement in capital markets and to place this evolution in the
context of contemporary banking theory.
The communication is structured as follows: long run developments in the
banking industry are briefly reviewed, in macro economic perspective and
illustrated by empirical evidence. Next, the evolving role of banks in capi-
tal markets is sketched and the present distinction between bank-based and
market-based financial systems investigated. Finally, the current paradigm on
the intermediating role of banks in the economy is reconsidered in an attempt
to realign the paradox between theory and evidence.
2 LONG RUN DEVELOPMENTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
There is ample evidence to support the claim that banks play an increas-
ing role in the economy and the capital markets. This section briefly sketches
long run developments in the banking industry in a macro economic perspec-
tive, illustrated by empirical evidence. These developments concern the ratio
of total financial assets and bank assets to GDP, the value addition of the
banking sector to GDP, employment in the banking sector, the mix of inter-
est and other income in total bank revenue, and finally the weight of bank
shares in total stock exchange value. The figures are related to the US and
the EU, incidentally to the Netherlands.
NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS 309
2.1 Total Financial Assets and Bank Credit as a Percentage of GDP
The impressive growth of total financial assets (the sum of stock market capi-
talisation, bank credit to the private sector and domestic debt securities issued
by the private sector), representing the financial system as a whole, is widely
known nowadays. This growth surpasses the growth of GDP strongly. Less
known is that the growth of bank assets also surpasses the growth of GDP, be
it less spectacular. The often commented disintermediation tendency, mean-
ing that bank credit is supplanted by capital market financing or financing
provided by non bank financial and non-financial institutions, is a real phe-
nomenon but its scope is of relative, not absolute importance. The following
figures, derived from ECB studies and statistics, are illustrating this (Tables 1
and 2). Note that these figures even don’t include private equity (unless refi-
nanced by bank credit or via the public capital market) and non-listed invest-
ment funds! The trend is clear: bank credit grows in relation to GDP in the
EU area and the growth rate is accelerating.
The same trend is visible in the United States, as we already know from
studies by Barth, updated by Allen and Santomero (2001). They calculated
that bank assets to GDP rose from 25% in 1950 to over 80% in 1998. Our
own calculations point to the following figures in Table 3. Here too an accel-
eration of the growth rate in recent years is visible.
TABLE 1 – TOTAL FINANCIAL ASSETS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2005
Euro area 140 180 210
UK 225 280 300
US 220 400 410
Source: ECB (2006): “The performance of the European Financial System”.
TABLE 2 – BANK CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
1985 1990 1995 1997 2005 2006 2007
EU (Euro area+UK+Sweden) 96 117 117 124
UK 147 201 206 220
Euro area sec 113 118 121
Source: ECB (2000): “EU Banks’ Income Structure”. Years 2005–2007 are derived from tables in
ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2008.
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TABLE 3 – TOTAL ASSETS AT ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS (YEAR END) AS A PER-
CENTAGE OF GDP IN CURRENT PRICES
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007
US 56 56 57 57 57 62 70 78
Source: Federal Reserve System: time series.
TABLE 4 – ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH; EURO AREA
Credit to private sector M3 GDP HICP GDP+HICP
(real prices)
2004 7 6 2.1 + 2.1 = 4.2
2005 9 8 1.6 + 2.2 = 3.8
2006 11 8 2.8 + 2.2 = 5.0
2007 11 11 2.6 + 2.1 = 4.7
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2008: Euro Area Overview. HICP is consumer price index.
Growth of GDP in real prices plus growth of HICP are used as proxy of growth of nominal
GDP.
2.2 Monetary Dynamics and the Growth of Bank Credit
The growth of bank credit as a percentage of GDP is reflected in the growth
figures of M1, M2 and M3, which also exceed the growth of GDP strongly in
recent years in the EMU. Although the growth of bank credit to the private
sector can differ widely from the growth of M3 in individual years, the long
run parallel is striking, especially since 2004. This is not surprising taking into
account that bank credit, together with a balance of payments surplus, is the
main source of M1-2 growth. The growth rates of bank credit and M3 are
clearly exceeding the growth of GDP in these years, as can be seen in Table 4.
The excess growth of bank credit and M3 over GDP creates an increas-
ing “money gap”. The “money gap” indicates the difference between the level
of M3 and the level needed for non-inflationary growth. A large part of this
“money gap” reflects, according to the Annual Report 2005 of the ECB, tem-
porary higher liquidity holdings as an effect of portfolio readjustment by
investors on the capital markets.2
The “money gap” is an important indicator of liquidity potentially des-
tined for investment on the capital market; when stock prices are rising the
money will be used again for reinvestment. As the liquidity is held with banks
2 See graph 9 on page 35 of Annual Report ECB 2005 (ECB 2006).
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the “money gap” is also an important indicator of the supportive role of
banks to the capital market. In previous years, 1999 and 2000, an opposite
movement took place: bank credit was growing stronger than M3. This may
have indicated – in the absence of a EMU balance of payments deficit –
a building up of capital market investments with bank credit; the “money
gap” was low at that time. Bank credit growth exceeding M3 growth and M3
growth exceeding nominal GDP growth are therefore presumably important
signs of a deep involvement of banks in capital markets, supplying them with
massive financing of capital market investments.3
2.3 Bank Sector Income as a Percentage of GDP
The more than proportional increase of bank credit, in comparison to GDP,
does not imply a parallel increase of bank sector income as a percentage of
GDP because the margin on assets earned by the banks decreased. This mar-
gin (interest plus non-interest income, as a percentage of total bank assets)
decreased from 2.90% to 2.78% over the years 1995 to 1998 in the EU (EU
Staff Report, 2000). This decrease is sizeable over 4 years time, but the 7 per-
centage points increase of bank credit to GDP over the same period (see fig-
ures above) overcompensated the loss, resulting in a slight increase of 0.05%
of bank sector contribution to GDP during these years. In its 2005 Annual
Report the European Central Bank (2006) underlines the prominent place of
services in the sector composition of GDP in the EU countries.4 Not less
than 27% of GDP is related to financial and other services. This percentage is,
according to the study, growing over time: on average 0.7% each quarter dur-
ing the period 1991 to 2005, compared to 0.5% growth of total GDP. Unfor-
tunately the study does not specify financial services in the services compo-
nent, nor banking in financial services, but it seems reasonable to assume that
banking did take its share in the relative growth of the services component.
This conjecture is also based on the approximation calculated in Table 5.
Real estate is of course the confusing element in the figures above, but nev-
ertheless do they feed the impression that financial intermediation is gaining
ground in GDP. It is unfortunate, and also surprising, that Eurostat does not
publish a full specification of the sector composition of GDP of the Euro and
EU area.5
3 International Monetary Fund (2005) has made a comparable analysis in “Global Financial
Stability Report 2005” and also observed for the G7 countries (except Japan) a considerable
growth of excess liquidity held by the private sector.
4 In a separate box on pp. 61–64.
5 Neither the OECD publishes figures on bank sector income of the member states, but they
do on total financial sector income. These data show moderately varying percentages in recent
years (4.5 to 4.9% in 2001 to 2004/5) for the most important continental European countries:
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, with a fairly constant trend over this period. In contrast to
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TABLE 5 – EURO AREA: GROSS VALUE ADDED OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION,
REAL ESTATE, AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (AT MARKET PRICES)
1995 22.1
2000 23.6
2005 24.8
2007 25.0
Source: ECB: Statistical Data Warehouse.
TABLE 6 – UNITED STATES: COMPOSITION OF GDP BY SECTOR, IN PERCENTAGES
Banks Finance and Insurance
1998 3.2 7.3
2000 3.2 7.5
2001 3.6 7.7
2002 4.0 7.9
2003 4.1 7.9
2004 3.8 7.8
2005 3.8 7.7
2006 n.a. 7.8
Source: Bureau of the Census.
The relevant figures for the US are easier to find (Bureau of the Census,
see Table 6). From statistics of the composition of GDP by sector the follow-
ing percentages of contribution of the banking industry and financial services
(including banking) to GDP can be derived. Remarkable is the strong growth
of the banking percentages between 2000 and 2003. In these years the stock
exchange was still depressed; on the other hand, the banking industry might
have been less influenced by the sluggish economy in these years than other
industries.
For the Netherlands too the value addition of banks to GDP can be
derived from national statistics (Table 7). Between 1988 and 2005 the value
addition to GDP by all Dutch industries increased 123%, by banks: 156%;
(the value addition by insurance companies and pension funds even 233%).
So, the Dutch picture resembles to the US, showing a light cyclical but in
the long run distinctly growing contribution to GDP. In the Netherlands
Footnote 5 continued
continental Europe a distinct upward trend is to be seen in the UK (4.8% in 2001, 7.4% in
2004), in the US (see the figures in Table 6 of the US Bureau of the Census; the OECD
figures are identical) and also in the Netherlands (6.2% in 2001, 7.4% in 2004).
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TABLE 7 – NETHERLANDS: VALUE ADDED BY BANKS TO GDP (IN PERCENTAGES)
1988 3.7
1990 2.8
1995 3.7
1998 3.2
2000 3.4
2001 3.4
2002 4.0
2003 4.3
2004 4.4
2005 4.3
Source: CBS.
the banking and insurance industries might have profited from the relative
favourable fiscal treatment of pension savings and private mortgage lending.
It should be noted that the interpretation of a growing level of bank sec-
tor income in GDP is ambivalent. The direct effect is undoubtedly positive:
a higher bank sector income is directly translated into higher GDP. But from
the viewpoint of efficiency of the banking system a high sector income might
be interpreted as having a negative impact on economic growth, as the high
income level may be gained thanks to imperfect banking markets allowing for
high interest margins; high margins obtained by “fat” banks unduly hamper
GDP growth (Diamond and Rajan 2001). But interest margins are continu-
ously shrinking during the past decades, due to stronger competition in liber-
alized banking markets. So, this argument is loosing relevance, if ever it was
relevant.
2.4 Bank Employment
Eurostat has not yet published recent yearly figures for the EU as a whole.
Over the period 1998 to 2001 the total number of persons employed in bank-
ing in the Euro area increased slightly, from 2.15million to 2.22million. It
might be assumed that this number fell slightly in the years afterwards as
costs reducing interventions by banks’ management became more severe in
the years after 2001. It is noteworthy that in the largest continental EU
countries employment in banking remained fairly stable, or decreased only
slightly, over a fairly long period of time (Germany, France, Spain: 1994–
2000) and even increased in Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK, the
last one being the most important capital market based country in Europe
(same period 1994–2000).
For the US the Bureau of the Census does not publish separate figures of
bank employment, only of finance and insurance combined. Employment of
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these industries together rose from 6.6million in 2000 to 7.0million in 2005
(4.9% and 5.0% of total labour force). Note the relatively high and slightly
increasing labour productivity, comparing these percentages with those of the
sector contribution to GDP.
Dutch bank employment figures are available over a fairly long period
(CBS). In 1987 132,000 persons were employed in banking (2.1% of total
labour force), in 2005 156,000 (1.9% of labour force). The number peaked in
2001: 170,000 (2.0% of labour force).
2.5 Composition of Bank Income
We noticed already that the strong volume growth of bank credit is not fully
reflected in the growth of net interest income, as increased competition in the
industry and from other financial and non-financial institutions, has put the
interest margins under severe pressure. Several studies by IMF, BIS, ECB and
central banks have illustrated this. Moreover, part of the interest margin is a
result of the so called mismatch (the duration arbitrage implied in borrow-
ing short and lending long). The flattening of the yield curve in recent years
restricted the profitability of mismatching and is an additional force pushing
down the interest margin.
The causes behind the increased competition can be summarised under the
heading: disintermediation and liberalisation. Large companies found their
way to capital market financing instead of bank credit (sometimes through
their own financing company) and insurance companies set up their own
mortgage lending and saving schemes. The opening of national borders,
ordered by liberalisation and deregulation measures, intensified cross bor-
der competition in the upper segment of traditional bank lending. Banks
formulated answers to this volume- and margin-erosion along three policy
lines: conglomeration, internationalisation and extended penetration on capi-
tal markets. Conglomeration meant briefly mergers between banks and insur-
ance companies to reach economies of scale and scope mainly in the retail
market. Examples of bank-insurance combinations have remained scarce.
Their success in terms of value added by the combination is very limited and
unbundling already happens (Credit Suisse/Winterthur).
Internationalisation turned out to be a long affair for most banks and only
really successful for a handful of them.6
6 See Slager (2006):, p. 9: “Internationalization for banks as a group produces doubtful
results for bank profitability and shareholders. Foreign profitability is on average lower than
domestic; an increase in internationalization therefore lowers total profitability. Also, foreign
banking activities do not improve stability of earnings. Geographical diversification benefits
were not observed for the total banking organization. A small group of banks succeeds
though”.
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The most successful answer to the increased competition in the tra-
ditional banking business was certainly the intensified penetration of the
banks on the capital markets. This is clearly illustrated by their other
income revenue. A study by the European Central Bank (2000), called “EU
Banks’ Income Structure”, reports that the relative importance of non-interest
income increased as a percentage of their total operating income throughout
the whole observed period 1989 to 1998. In the latter part of this period, 1995
to 1998, there was a noteworthy increase from 32% to 41%.7 Non-interest
income, expressed as a percentage of total assets, largely compensated the
decline of the interest margin. Over the whole observed period this margin
declined, in particular in 1995 to 1998 when it came down from 1.96% to
1.63%. By contrast, the non-interest income to assets ratio increased from
0.94% to 1.15% and thus compensated the decrease of the interest margin of
0.33% by 0.21%. From a later study by the European Central Bank (2006)
it can be derived that the interest margin further declined by 0.35% and the
non-interest ratio further increased by 0.2% during 2000 to 2003.8
A dominant part of non-interest income is capital market related. Non-
capital market related revenues are commissions for credit guarantees, doc-
umentary credits, national and international payments and foreign exchange
transactions. These commissions grow slower than capital market related
income like commissions for securities transactions ordered by clients, corpo-
rate finance advisory fees, underwriting and sales fees and, above all, propri-
etary securities trading. The ECB study does not provide a split up in capital
market and non-capital market income but specifications in the study give
ground to the supposition that around 75% of non-interest income is market
related (1993–1998) while the rest is not, and that the market related compo-
nent is cyclically growing.
Big retail banks like Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, BNP man-
aged to broaden their capital market business quickly by buying British and
American investment banks. The EU program of deregulation of banking
and liberalisation and harmonisation of capital markets, initiated in the early
nineties, together with the introduction of the Euro in 1999/2001, helped
them strongly to unfold this new orientation. The upsurge of stock mar-
kets and gradual decrease of interest rates since the early eighties stimu-
lated the market orientation too. Liberalisation of the financial markets went
hand in hand with privatisation of government owned companies in many
European countries. This too created big business. Mergers and acquisitions
became booming. This all resulted in initial private offerings, market consoli-
dation of take-over financing, proprietary trading, new investment funds and
7 The Annual Report of De Nederlandsche Bank reports on p. 120 that in twenty years time
interest income decreased from 70% to 50% in favour of other income.
8 Charts 32 and 34 in Hartmann et al. (2006).
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over-the-counter trading of derivatives becoming important spearheads of
banks’ business in a very short period of time.
2.6 Weight of Bank Shares in Total Stock Exchange Value
Figures on the long run development of bank profits in the EU and the US,
in relation to total corporate profits, are not available on macro level. But as
far as profits are reflected in the stock exchange value of listed companies the
value of banks can easily be related to the value of all listed companies. Cal-
culation of the weight of bank shares in the total market capitalisation gives
an important, and also a surprising, insight in the increasing importance of
banks in investment portfolios in the long run.
In the US the weight of bank shares (commercial banks and investment
banks taken together) in total stock market capitalisation has increased spec-
tacularly, from 1.8% in January 1973 to 6.9% in January 2008 (Table 8).
All figures are also illustrated in charts in the Appendix. The source is
Datastream with 1973 the first year available. In Europe the weight of bank
shares started higher: 9.1% in January 1973. This is understandable in view
of the more bank oriented character of the European financial system and,
related to this, the relative smaller aggregate size of capital markets in Europe.
Here the weight of bank shares also increased, to 15.8% in January 2008.
That means, in percentage points even more than in the US, but in a relative
sense somewhat less.
TABLE 8 – WEIGHT OF BANK SHARES IN TOTAL MARKET CAPITALISATION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EURO AREA, IN PERCENTAGES (JANUARY AND
DECEMBER)
US Euro area
1973 1.8–2.1 9.1–9.3
1984 2.1–2.4 8.9–8.2
1989 3.6–3.5 10.2–10.1
1990 3.5–3.0 10.2–10.7
1992 4.4–5.2 10.3–11.3
1999 8.0–6.3 15.1–14.6
2000 6.4–7.3 13.6–15.4
2004 9.9–9.6 18.1–18.8
2006 8.7–9.0 18.8–18.8
2007 8.9–6.5 19.1–16.4
2008 6.9 15.8
Own calculations; Source: Datastream.
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The upward trend in the weight was far from straight-lined, however. The
most important movements can be summarized in Table 8.
The fluctuations around the upward trend line had different causes over
time, most likely both sector-intrinsic (bank crises, interest rate and yield
curve movements, stock market volume fluctuations) and macro-economic.
During recessions bank shares are more attractive because of their high div-
idend yield; during upswings shares of growth oriented companies are more
popular. The strong downturn in the weights in 2007, both in the US and
Europe, is a spectacular result of the current bank crisis. The downturn con-
tinued in 2008.
Europe roughly followed, with some delay, the US development of stock
market weights. The weight was rather steady, fluctuating mostly between 9%
and 10% from 1973 until 1992, whereas it was steady too in the US, fluctuat-
ing around 2% and 3% until 1990. A “take off” happened after these years,
with an interruption in 1999/2000, to around 10% in the US (mid 2003–
August 2004), and 19% in Europe (mid 2006). In Europe like in the US bank
stock prices are falling stronger than the market recently, under influence of
the bank crisis.
Considered over the long run, the upward trend in the weight of bank
shares in total market capitalisation demonstrates a fluctuating but unmistak-
ably positive shift of investors’ preferences towards bank shares. What could
be the reason for this shift? An obvious explanation could be that the per-
formance of bank shares made them gradually more attractive in comparison
to other shares. This hypothesis is, perhaps surprisingly, supported by facts
in the US for the full period and, later, also in Europe. In the US the total
return to investment (= share price increases plus dividends ) increased over
the whole period 1973–2007 more on bank shares than on total stock. This is
expressed by the ratio of bank share return to total market return. This ratio
climbed from 1.0 in 1973 (first calculated year) to 1.5 in 1986 and further
to 2.0 in 2003, with two drops to 0.8 and 1.0 respectively in 1990 and 2000.
Recently the ratio declined again, to 1.5 (See charts in Appendix). A view on
the charts reveals immediately the very close connection between bank shares
weight and the return ratio in all years; when the return ratio went up the
bank shares weight went up, and vice versa.9
In Europe the bank/market return ratio declined between 1976 and 1992
to about 0.6, but moved up again to 0.95 in 2007. Here too, all fluctuations
in the return ratio are reflected in weight fluctuations, be it that before 1992
downward fluctuations in the return ratio are weakly translated in downward
weight fluctuations and after that year upward return fluctuations strongly in
9 Note that in a static equity portfolio a ratio bank/market return>1 automatically leads to
an increasing weight of bank shares in the total portfolio, assuming full reinvestment of divi-
dends.
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upward weight movements. This asymmetry is striking. It is clear that the
take off of the weight from 10% to 19% after 1992 was supported by the
recovery of the return ratio.
Dividend yields are part of total returns on share investments but play a
separate role in investors’ preferences. Dividend yields on bank shares in the
US distinctly exceed those of the stock market as a whole and the excess grew
over time: from 0.5% in l973 to 2% in 2007. In Europe bank dividend yields
were lower than the market in 1973 but exceeded the market since 1983. The
ratio dividend yields banks/market increased in the US from 1.3 in l973 to
2.2 in 2007 and in Europe from 0.8 to 1.3. There was an extreme peak in
the ratio in 1999, both in the US and Europe, indicating the extraordinary
decrease of dividend yields on other-than-bank shares during the peak of the
“bubble”. It is conceivable that the increase of the dividend yield ratio over
time in both the US and Europe has favoured the increase of bank weights
in total stock investment.
Price-earning ratios of banks were over the period on average lower
(around 11; investment banks 14) than of non-financials (around 17).The dif-
ference in p/e ratios between the two categories was fluctuating during the
years, sometimes sharply in favour of other shares (strong market growth) and
sometimes sharply in favour of banks (strong market decline). In the US the
p/e ratio banks/market fluctuated in the range 0.6–0.8, with sharp exceptions
in 1987 (upward) and 2000 (downward). In Europe the ratio developed along
similar lines, on the level 0.8 since 1988. A ratio below 1.0, indicating a rela-
tive lower p/e level for bank shares, points to a higher risk premium required
by investors, in accordance with a higher volatility of bank shares than of
other shares. It is noteworthy that the bank/market p/e ratios in the US and
Europe did not move upward on the long run. They therefore do not help to
explain the increasing bank weights over the long run.
Houston and Stiroh (2006) found that over the period 1975 to 2005 finan-
cial sector volatility has steadily increased, reaching extraordinary levels from
1998 to 2002. Our chart (see Appendix) of the ratio bank/market volatility
(calculated on the basis of monthly averages of stock prices) shows that also
before 1998 extreme peaks appeared in the US and that in Europe, after the
last peak in 1998, bank volatility calmed down to near average levels in more
recent years. Some short periods excepted the bank/market volatility ratio was
above 1.0 (in most years in the range of 1.0–1.5) in the full period 1973–2007,
both in the US and in Europe, in accordance with the low p/e ratio.
2.7 Summary of Empirical Indications
Despite the often cited increasing pressures on the traditional deposit taking
and lending business of banks, due to disintermediation by non-bank institu-
tions and by increasing financing/ investment via capital markets, the banking
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industry has not shrunk. Not in the US, nor in Europe. On the contrary, the
banking industry expanded steadily and consistently over the past decades.
Bank credit grew faster than GDP, as did bank sector income of GDP in the
US and the Netherlands. Lack of statistics prevented to conclude this for the
EU as a whole, where it is certain that the total services component of GDP
is relatively growing. The financial services part is growing too in the UK,
being fairly stable in the largest continental countries. Bank employment also
grew until recently, or decreased only slightly.
Most striking is the spectacular growth in popularity of bank shares in
investment portfolios since 1973.This growth seems to have been driven by a
market exceeding growth of total return to equity over the whole period. The
expansion of banking was not stopped by, but went hand in hand with, the
expansion of the capital markets and had undoubtedly to do with the deep
involvement of banks in capital markets, as will be amplified below. The par-
allel instead of contradictory evolution of banks and capital markets sheds
another light on the discussion on the structure of the financial system, espe-
cially on its evolution from being bank based to market based.
3 THE ROLE OF BANKS IN CAPITAL MARKETS
The strong growth of bank credit to the private sector during recent years,
exceeding the growth of nominal GDP, together with the strong growth of
the “money gap”, demonstrate how important bank credit has become to the
capital markets, especially the stock exchanges, and how equally important
bank deposits, containing “precautionary” and “speculative” money accord-
ing to Keynes’ nomenclature, have become. This importance for the markets
could perhaps be roughly characterized by the observation that every excess
percentage growth of bank credit above the growth of nominal GDP – that
means real GDP growth plus inflation of real products and services – is blow-
ing liquidity into the financial economy. This leads to price inflation of finan-
cial assets traded on capital markets to the degree that the excess liquidity is
not absorbed by new financial assets, created through the issue of new finan-
cial titles in public and private markets. Anyhow, the (potential) liquidity in
the capital markets resulting from the relatively high growth of bank credit
and deposits, has become massive. The sizeable increases of the ratio of bank
credit to GDP and of M3, as presented above, illustrate the magnitude of this
phenomenon.
The provision of liquidity is, as is well known, not the only service banks
deliver to capital markets. Underwriting of new issues and securities broker-
age were historically the exclusive domain of investment banks and securities
brokers, but universal banks have, particularly after they took over the major-
ity of securities brokers and investment banks, an overriding share in this
business, at least in Europe. And this business is growing at an accelerated
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pace. The volume of initial private offerings has grown tremendously and so
did the underwriting fees; mergers and acquisitions show the same eye catch-
ing development and so do the advisory fees. On the liquidity side banks
often provide large financing for takeovers, mostly when they also act as
advisors. This has got an even bigger dimension since private equity funds are
worldwide taking interests in corporations on a large scale. These participa-
tions are massively financed by bank credit, partly or fully paid back by a
super dividend of the newly acquired company (which often needs credit to
finance the dividend!). Although no figures are published, or can be derived
from bank annual reports, on credit extended to private equity funds or,
in general, on credit for financing corporate take-overs, it must be assumed
that banks have managed to find ample compensation for their relative loss
of corporate credit volume to corporate financing via capital markets. They
continue to provide back-up credit lines to corporations and they finance the
capital market operations of other financial institutions like private equity
funds. Just like interest margins on credit, the commissions on securities
brokerage eroded. Here the growing market power of institutional investors
changed the rules of the game. Complete disappearance of commission on
large orders and on block trading forced the banks into proprietary trading,
that means trading for their own account. Underwriting and proprietary trad-
ing have made the capital market business of banks both more remunera-
tive and more risky. This is reflected in “other income”. During episodes of
more than average GDP growth and declining interest rates/inflation expecta-
tions “other income” is booming; in the reverse situation “other income” falls
back, be it that the base revenues in this item, comprising both banking and
securities commissions, provide a fairly stable minimum.10
Noteworthy too is that innovation of capital market instruments mostly
emanates from banks. Banks played a prominent role in the development of
new corporate finance instruments like convertible bonds, reverse convertibles,
equity linked bonds, warrants, subordinated debt, mezzanine finance etc. They
developed project finance, which means stand alone finance without recourse
to initiating companies. They developed lease financing structures, which are
also applied now by institutional investors for their investment purposes. They
securitize packages of private mortgages, receivables, lease portfolios etc. for
investment by other institutional parties and thus create new markets for
private investment. Securitization has now become part of their solvability
and liquidity management. Banks developed a broad spectrum of investment
funds, both listed on stock exchanges and unlisted. They lead the innovative
process towards complete new investment instruments like real estate notes,
protected equity funds and funds of funds (mixed equity/fixed income; hedge
funds with different investment policies). More recently they developed CDO’s
10 See the earlier quoted ECB study (2000, p. 6).
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(Collateralized Debt Obligations): corporate bond funds with differentiated
risk profiles, making use of credit default swaps.11 Within a very short time
span the volume of these constructed, new investment instruments reached a
staggering high level, now potentially impairing the stability of the financial
system. The more so because the ownership of these new titles – when placed
in conduits in which the creating bank keeps a minority shareholding in order
to avoid balance sheet consolidation – is far from transparent.
The construction of these new products adds to the other income item of
banks when placed with institutional and private investors directly or via con-
duits and other special investment vehicles or adds to their interest income
when held on their own balance sheets. But the inherent lack of transparency
of these products, in conjunction with them being traded exclusively on infor-
mal markets outside the official stock exchanges, with ratings by rating agen-
cies as sole anchor for the pricing, and no public information available on
prices and traded volumes, now turns into a major set back for these prod-
ucts. Their unknown volume leaves open any reliable knowledge about the
size of these bank made investment instruments in relation to the conven-
tional capital market instruments, and leaves also open the present commit-
ment of banks to these instruments. This backfires on public confidence in the
banking industry – its most precious asset – as it experiences now.
Not all financial product innovation comes from banks. The stock
exchanges cooperated with banks in developing stock exchange listed finance
instruments and the derivatives exchanges contributed milestones to innova-
tion by creating market platforms for standardized options and futures on
stocks and bonds. But over-the-counter options on equity and interest yield
curves are tailor made inventions by banks. The same is true for the newest
over-the-counter market: that of credit default swaps and other credit deriv-
atives. This new market, originally developed by JP Morgan some ten years
ago, has nearly doubled every year during the last five years and has reached
the size of 26 billion US dollars in the second half of 2006.12 Credit deriv-
atives are now on the brink of being introduced on public exchanges. All
these new private markets now compete with the public derivatives markets
in importance for the financial system.
It should also be noted that private funds investing in ships or real estate,
mostly making use of certain income tax advantages, are notable examples of
non-bank innovations.
It is remarkable that other financial industries like (not bank-linked) invest-
ment fund managers, insurance companies and pension funds, did hardly
11 See Llewellyn (2008), “Financial Innovation and the Economics of Banking and the
Financial System” (Introductory chapter, to be published), for an overview of financial inno-
vation in the nineties and its impact on the efficiency and stability of the financial system.
12 Financieele Dagblad April 7, 2007; DNB’s Annual Report (2007, p. 121); DNB (2008).
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contribute to the development of new financial market instruments. They
are mostly users, not inventors of financial instruments and copiers of new
investment structures invented by banks.
The growing involvement of banks in the spectacular development of cap-
ital markets – reflected in the change of their activities and composition of
their revenues – obviously had a strong impact on the character, strategic pri-
orities and organisation of the banking industry. Not all banks, however, con-
centrated on capital market business or they retreated partly because of the
specific risks and volatility of that business. Many wisely preferred to concen-
trate on traditional banking services and to capitalise on their regional client
base. Others decided not to be active in all capital markets with all invest-
ment banking services. It is, after all, a not very large, but leading force of
big US investment banks and big US and European universal banks that ini-
tiated a very powerful support and innovative stimulus to the capital markets
on a world wide scale.
Historically, banks have always facilitated, as brokers, the functioning of
capital markets. Nowadays banks act as brokers as well as financiers, pro-
prietary dealers and inventors of new investment products. They now are an
integral part of capital markets. As inventors, dealers and financiers of prod-
ucts on the over-the-counter market they essentially condition the develop-
ment of capital markets, including these markets in the systemic risk of the
banking industry, as we are discovering today.
Blommestein (2006) has painted a colourful sketch of the fundamental
changes in banking in the past and near future in his inaugural address to
the Tilburg University on 25 November 2005. In his concluding remarks he
argues “that a new hybrid type of banking system is emerging, with both
strong links to capital markets and a renewed emphasis on competency-
based relationship banking. In this new type of banking system, called a
relationship-cum-market-based banking system, financial engineering and the
integration of products and services from outside suppliers will play an even
greater role than before”. He considers it likely “that based on our long-term
vision of the future, financial systems from all jurisdictions will be dominated
by new and complex links between banks and capital markets”.13
4 BANK-BASED VERSUS MARKET-BASED
Since the pioneering work of Goldsmith on the structure of financial systems
there was a long silence on this topic until during the end of the nineties
and in the early years of the present century a group of researchers (Allen
and Gale, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, Beck, Huizinga and others) reopened the
discussion on the question which type of financial system: bank-based or
13 SUERF Studies 2006/2, pp. 37, 57–58.
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market based, would be most conducive to economic growth. Thanks to their
theoretical analysis (mostly Allen and Gale) and their extensive empirical
investigations this question is clearly settled.
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) classified the financial system of 150
countries on the basis of a conglomerate ratio of banking sector development
versus stock market development. They also classified these financial systems
as highly developed versus underdeveloped. They found that: (1) financial
systems (the totality of banks, institutional investors, stock and bond mar-
kets) are on average more developed in high income countries; (2) national
financial systems become more market oriented as they become richer; (3)
countries with an Anglo-Saxon law tradition, strong protection of shareholder
rights, good accounting regulations tend to be more market based, whereas
countries with a French civil law tradition, poor market- and protection-
oriented bank-regulation tend to have underdeveloped financial systems. The
importance of a sound contracting system and regulatory environment for
development of the financial system, be it bank-based or market-based, is
stressed (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). The authors also found that
countries do not grow faster in either market-based or bank-based financial
systems, but that economic growth is higher in countries with higher levels of
overall financial-sector development.
Levine (2002) summarized the outcome of the research as follows: “This
view minimizes the bank-based versus market-based debate and emphasizes
the quality of financial services produced by the entire financial system . . ..
Distinguishing countries by financial structure (bank-based or market-based)
does not help in explaining cross-country differences in long-run economic
performance. Rather, . . . distinguishing countries by their overall level of
financial development helps to explain cross-country difference in economic
growth. Countries with greater degrees of financial development – as mea-
sured by aggregate measures of bank development and market development
– enjoy substantially greater growth rates”.
The outcome of the research provides empirical evidence on competing
theories of financial structure: the bank-based view highlighting the posi-
tive role of banks as financial intermediaries by acquiring information about
firms and managing risk, thereby enhancing investment efficiency and eco-
nomic growth, versus the market-based view highlighting the growth enhanc-
ing role of well-functioning markets by effectively transmitting information
to all investors, not hampered by powerful banks that extract informational
rents and protect established firms with close bank-firm ties from compe-
tition. The research endorses neither of these views; it endorses the so-
called financial services view, as formulated by Merton and Bodie (1995)
and Levine (1997). This view minimizes the importance of the bank-based
versus market-based debate and stresses that the whole context of finan-
cial arrangements – markets, institutions, legal and regulatory environment
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– should and can be conducive to ameliorate market imperfections. Accord-
ing to this view, the main issue is not banks or markets. The issue is cre-
ating an environment in which intermediaries and markets provide sound
financial services. The financial services view places the analytical spot-
light on how to create better functioning banks and markets, and rele-
gates the bank-based versus market-based debate to the shadows (Levine,
2002).
The financial services view also resounds in the authoritative study “Com-
paring Financial Systems” by Allen and Gale (2000). They analyzed the
history of the most important national financial systems and opened the-
oretical insights into the differences of the various systems. One of their
main arguments is “that financial institutions, intermediaries and firms,
solve market failures and compensate for the limitations of financial mar-
kets”. Their analysis is focussed on market imperfections and the need for
intermediary parties and market governance to overcome these imperfec-
tions. In most of the chapters the functioning of banks and other inter-
mediaries in capital markets is analysed, but only from the viewpoint of
removal or compensation of market imperfections; no allusion is made to
the intrinsic contribution of banks to the functioning of the markets as
such.
This is our main argument in this debate: the supposed antithesis between
bank-based and market-based financial systems is not realistic as in market-
based systems capital markets are developing thanks to the facilitating and
innovative support by the banking system. As we have argued above, there
are inextricable ties between banks and capital markets; the growth of capital
markets is, particularly in recent years, strongly pushed by banks. Therefore, it
would be better to speak of “bank-oriented” and “market-oriented” financial
systems, or “bank-dominated” and “market-dominated” systems, as market-
based systems are bank-based in many respects and owe their evolution
largely to the market orientation that banks have taken.14
Recent research also bypasses, in line with Merton and Bodie’s functional
approach, the distinction between bank- and market-based financial systems,
by focussing on the quality of the system measured by its impact on produc-
tivity and growth of GDP. By quality of the financial system is meant the
efficiency of banks, the level of bank competition, capital market organisa-
tion and liquidity, transparency, shareholder and creditor rights, ownership
structures, corporate governance etc. (Hartmann et al. 2006). Access of small
14 David T.Llewellyn (op.cit. p. 34) comes to a conclusion in the same direction: “In many
ways, new financial instruments (especially those focussed on shifting credit risks) have changed
in a fundamental way the underlying economics of banking. As part of this the traditional
formal distinction between bank and capital market intermediation has tended to become less
pronounced”.
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and young innovative companies to external finance sources draws attention
(Bena and Jurajda 2007). More generally, the question to what extent and
in particular, how financial development and deepening of the financial sys-
tem fosters macro economic growth and to what extent this process is nation
specific, maintains central attention (Rousseau 2007; Wachtel 2007). Research
on the central “causation question” (does the financial system promote eco-
nomic growth or does economic growth promote the financial system?) got
a major stimulus by the authoritative cross-section study by Levine (l997).
See also Fase (2000) and Fase and Abma (2003). Banks have, through their
close ties with capital markets, strongly benefited from the spectacular growth
of these markets, both in their “other income” revenues and in their market
related interest income. Their involvement in capital market business is the
main reason why banks were prospering, against the odds.
5 BANKING THEORY: A NOTE ON THE PARADIGM OF BANKING
5.1 Forgotten and Present Paradigms
It took a long time – effectively until the fifties of last century – before the
money creating function of banks (already determined by Hawtrey in 1919
and Hahn in 192015), instead of their merely being intermediaries between
savers and investors, was generally accepted and codified as a basic paradigm
in the “canon” of monetary analysis and policy. Since then, the liquidity cre-
ating function of banks seemed so obvious that it did not even get a place
in a next banking paradigm which emerged, in the 1970’s, as a specification
of the agency theory and the theory of transaction costs (Akerlof, Diamond,
Stiglitz and many others). In this paradigm asymmetric information is the key-
word for explaining the role of banks. This new, neoclassical approach took
the viewpoint of market imperfections. Financial markets are not transparent.
Therefore, the prime function of banks is to bridge information asymmetries
between savers and (real) investors. Banks act as agents between these parties.
Monitoring debtors on behalf of a coalition of savers, avoiding adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard, these are the key activities of banks, which they per-
form via acquired (captive) information on debtors against transaction costs
at efficient scale levels. These justify the transaction costs of the bank as a
firm according the theory of the firm. In the new theory of financial inter-
mediation banks act as agents in imperfect financial markets. More or less
forgotten was that banks create liquidity through risky credits, which wor-
ries central banks for monetary and systemic reasons and justifies minimum
solvency requirements for banks. In the new theory banks act as interme-
diating agents and do not need much capital because “fat” banks would
15 de Roos (1968), pp. 11–12.
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dominate the market and consequently aggravate market imperfections (Dia-
mond). Bank regulation leads to imperfect functioning financial markets and
must be weighed against this disadvantage.
For about three decades the information asymmetry approach provided a
rich variety of insights in the behaviour of banks in the credit and deposit
markets in different market structures and in situations of monetary tightness
or affluence. A micro economic theory of banking was constructed (Freixas
and Rochet 1997). The banking industry as institutional target of monetary
policy was investigated, making use of information asymmetry concepts, in
order to test the effectiveness of monetary policy. A drawback was, however,
that the information asymmetry approach of bank policies was well suited
for econometric modelling but in many cases less for empirical verification.
And the accumulation of incidental analyses of agency problems under infor-
mation asymmetry, mostly based on anecdotal evidence, buried the central
question what the basic function of banks in the economy is. Moreover, asym-
metric information as the central paradigm of banking runs into the para-
dox that, thanks to the blessings of the information and communication rev-
olution, information about markets and companies is readily available and
verifiable, everywhere and real time, and thus less asymmetric. Nowadays,
Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” get ratings by public rating agencies! So, taking
asymmetric information as the central paradigm of banking logically supports
the extinction scenario of the banking industry.
Do we see signs of nearing extinction? Do we see that the banks, thanks to
abundant availability of information, are bypassed by open financial markets
where savers meet investors directly? In a relative sense, yes. But in absolute
figures banks are flourishing, and growing like they always did, in terms of
asset growth, value added to GNP and stock exchange value, as we have
demonstrated above. Allen and Santomero (1998, 2001) and Scholtens and
Van Wensveen (2000) pointed to this paradox and supposed that another
basic force drives banking and might better serve as a central paradigm: risk
transformation.16
5.2 Risk Transformation
Despite the formidable growth of investment instruments traded on public
capital markets bank credits and deposits are growing as well. This indi-
cates that depositors want to shield a certain part of their savings against
the volatility of public markets. And they want secure, liquid titles. Banks
offer both. The sacrifice of depositors is lower interest, their gain is security
and liquidity, backed by banks. In the CAPM of savers the low side of the
investment spectrum mainly consists of bank investment instruments, not of
16 See also Scholtens and Van Wensveen (2003).
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traded market instruments. Real investors, on the other side, do not all have
an entrance ticket to the public capital market. That relates to the innumer-
able number of small companies which as a group form the backbone of the
economy, and the innumerable number of private persons who want financing
for their house and for other durable consumption goods. Both categories
remain dependent on banks, which implies that banks keep, both on the asset
side and the liability side of their balance sheets, a substantial piece of the
strongly rising financial cake. The transformation of deposits into credits is
risky in many respects (duration, counterparty, sovereign, currency risk, to
mention the most important ones). Therefore, risk transformation is the heart
of a bankers business and risk management is the central focus of his atten-
tion. Risk management is now accepted as the central theme in recent text-
books on banking (e.g. Cornett and Saunders 1999) and has got its proper
place in training courses (also to the satisfaction of bank supervisors!).
The risk transforming function of banks has got an even more promi-
nent meaning because the world economy has become substantially more
risky since the early 1970s. The blowing up, by the U.S., of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971, the oil crises in 1973 and 1979
followed by balance-of-payments crises in Latin America and Asia, and the
Russian political upheaval in the end of the eighties can be considered as the
most important idiosyncratic shocks that triggered a situation of much higher
inflation, initially sky high interest rates in the U.S. to combat inflation, sov-
ereign payment crises in large developing countries and strong price fluctua-
tions on the stock exchanges. Interest rate risk, stock market price risk, sov-
ereign and credit risk became much more important than before. All finan-
cial institutions were challenged to improve their risk management procedures
and to apply new instruments to cover the increased risks by spreading them
over markets and in the time. These new instruments (interest and currency
swaps and options, futures, FRA’s) were originally developed by banks and
later partly, in standardized form, taken over by public exchanges. Now two
circuits exist for these products: standardized contracts, mainly futures and
options, traded on exchanges, and a fast growing over-the counter market
(mainly interbank) for tailor made risk instruments. In recent years credit risk
instruments, like credit default swaps and real or synthetic credit risk securi-
tization, joined the existing products and show a steep rise.
All these instruments were essentially new because they embody a pure
risk transferring, not a finance or investment function. Because they imply a
(potential) future right or obligation they are booked off-balance. The new
instruments were primarily developed by banks to serve the needs of corpo-
rate and institutional clients for risk coverage. To limit their own net obliga-
tions banks started a fast growing interbank/inter financial-institution market.
This over-the-counter market reached in June 2006 the tremendous amount
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of about 370.000 billion US Dollars, nominal value (BIS, quoted in Annual
Report 2006 of DNB (2007)).
All this implies that in only a few decades time the risk transforma-
tion function of the banking industry has acquired an even more important
place in the financial intermediation process than it originally had via the
traditional in-balance business. So, not surprisingly, risk versus reward is now
the most important consideration of bank managers. Administrative systems
and ict systems are being remodelled around these key variables. Raroc (risk
adjusted return on capital) has become the guiding measure for every bank
activity.
5.3 The Functional Approach
Considered from Merton’s six underlying financial functions which form the
core needs served by the financial system the banking industry still fulfils all
these functions or provide essential services and instruments for their fulfil-
ment by capital markets. It is important to keep this in mind, as it puts into
perspective the evolution of the financial system from bank-based towards
market-based on a global scale. This is also, as we noted earlier, the key to
understanding the growing role of banking in terms of value addition to GNP
and stock market capitalisation. Merton and Bodie (1995) listed the follow-
ing underlying functions, forming the core needs of the financial system: (1)
methods of clearing and settling payments; (2) mechanisms for pooling of
resources; (3) ways to transfer economic resources through time and across
distances; (4) methods of managing risk; (5) price information to help coor-
dinate decentralized decision-making in various sectors of the economy; (6)
ways of dealing with incentive problems created when one party to a transac-
tion has information that another party does not or when one party acts as
agent for another.
In a recent publication Merton and Bodie (2005) proposed a synthesis of
the neoclassical, institutional and behavioural perspectives. In this synthesis of
functional and structural finance (FSF) the institutional structure is endoge-
nous. Market institutions are responding to market structures and market
behaviour, smoothing market imperfections in the transfer of resources. To
these imperfections belong behavioural biases.17 This integrated functional
approach represents a necessary addendum to the neoclassical approach in
which asymmetric information is the dominant factor. In the behavioural per-
spective risk awareness and risk perception plays a pivotal role.
17 Merton and Bodie (2005).
NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS 329
5.4 The Redefined Role of Banks
To summarize: the economic importance of banks has increased despite
the disintermediation effect of rising capital markets. This disintermediation
effect affected the traditional wholesale finance functions of banks which are
taken over by capital markets. However, the disintermediation effect proves
to be restricted and is partly compensated by wholesale financing of financial
institutions which have become increasingly active on capital markets. Rela-
tionship banking apparently still fulfils a solid role between banks and clients
both in the corporate and the private segment, besides standard products for
retail financing. Taken together, the traditional in-balance bank financing is
not declining but growing, in absolute terms and in relation to GDP, be it at
a lower pace than capital market financing.
The economic progress of banks should, moreover, be increasingly associ-
ated to their involvement in the fast growing capital markets. Their services
to these markets are so extensive, and their role in the product innovation
process in these markets is so dominant, that the well functioning of these
markets is to a high degree dependant on banks. The variety of their client
services to the capital markets is landing in both “other income” and interest
revenue. Their proprietary trading has, from time to time, a sizeable impact
on “other income” as well. “Other income” has gradually increased to 50% of
total bank revenue. The economic function of banks is clearly going beyond
the financing of GDP; it finances and services the capital market as well.
The deep involvement of banks in capital markets implies that the dis-
tinction between “bank- based” and “market-based” financial systems is less
meaningful. Recent research indicated already that this distinction does not
explain differences in economic growth between countries. “Market-based”
systems are developing thanks to the innovative support of banks. The spec-
tacular growth of these markets, on the other hand, strongly pushes the
growth of banks and may be the main reason why banks were prospering,
against the odds. Like bank credit, bank sector income has grown faster
than GDP and there was a structurally growing popularity of bank shares in
investment portfolios over the past thirty five years.
The increasing variety of bank services and the broadening of their cap-
ital market activities has not changed the common denominator of their
economic involvement. That is and remains: risk transformation. However,
risk transformation in modern banking has got a much broader scope than
risk transformation through the in-balance conversion of deposits into cred-
its. Risk transformation is likewise the essence of off-balance sheet deriva-
tive products sold by banks and securitized investment products offered by
them or by investment funds run by them. When these products are sold to
investors without recourse to the offering institution the risk is distributed
to these investors, in accordance with their risk/reward preferences. Via these
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products banks transfer risk to investors in stead of absorbing risk them-
selves. Their value addition to these products rests on their expertise to man-
age and transform risk.
6 THE BANKING CRISIS
In view of the above it is salient that the banking crisis, which started in the
course of 2007 and is dragging on in 2008, centres around securitized invest-
ment products like sub-prime mortgages and cdo’s and casts serious doubt on
the professional expertise of banks to manage and transform risk. What went
wrong? Banks blended private mortgage paper of different quality, packaged
and sold it to off-balance sheet vehicles which financed themselves by issuing
short-term notes in the over-the counter market. The notes were sold to large
institutional investors as cash management paper because they got favourable
ratings. These ratings were high because the default record of private mort-
gage lending was very favourable, until mid 2007. Here the first professional
mistake was made by banks who structured the paper and, above all, by the
rating agencies: the tables indicating the probability of default for various cat-
egories of mortgage collateral and personal income covered a short history in
which a widespread fall of house prices was lacking. Moreover, the trade in
the notes was implicitly based on the supposition that the ratings would never
change. The second mistake was that banks underestimated the liquidity risk
run by the notes issuing vehicles. They guaranteed the financing of their own
vehicle on the supposition that their guarantee by itself would secure continu-
ous (re)financing in the market. No thought was given to the possibility that
when a investment product would generally come under fire the whole refi-
nancing market could dry up. As soon as this happened all liquidity guaran-
tees were effectuated and turned out to be full guarantees. The notes, or the
mortgage portfolios themselves, had to be consolidated on the balance sheet
of the banks, which ended the game of solvency rule arbitrage by the originat-
ing banks. The third mistake, by supervisors, was that these had not, or insuf-
ficiently, recognized the potential impact of liquidity guarantees supporting
off-balance sheet vehicles from a systemic point of view. Liquidity risk was
of course well known on bank firm level. Now it manifested itself on market
level, as an immediate effect of severe asymmetric market information. This
asymmetric information was the result of a lack of transparency of the secu-
ritised new products and their ownership and created a unprecedented inter-
bank confidence crisis. The ownership was unknown partly because the notes
were not only bought by institutional investors but also by banks themselves,
as treasury paper. This presumably implied, and that would be the fourth mis-
take, that the buying of the notes – because they had a high rating – did
not pass the scrutiny of a credit committee of the bank. The result was that
the top management of the banks involved had been taken aback by both
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TABLE 9 – AGGREGATE RESERVES OF us DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (BLN US
DOLLARS)
Total reserves Required reserves Excess reserves
January 1959 11,263 10,765 498= 4.6% required
December 2006 43,363 41,500 1863= 4.3% required
December 2007 42,735 40,960 1775= 4.3% required
June 2008 43,932 41,552 2380= 5.7% required
Source: US Federal Reserve System, time series (June 2008).
the effectuated guarantees and the existing portfolios of notes. It should be
stressed that the mistakes spotted above do not point to the basic causes of
the crisis. These have to do with the excessive lending policies of American
mortgage institutions and their intermediaries, fuelled by the Fed’s long-term
policy of low interest rates, under a near absence of supervision on this indus-
try.18
The result was and is a shaken confidence in the banking industry. But
thanks to market interventions by central banks world-wide the sub-prime
crisis has not developed into a world-wide banking crisis. Lessons have to be
learnt by banks and by supervisors, who were confronted by a new type of
systemic risk, but it is fair to conclude that the present crisis has not impaired
the reserve position of the American banking system as a whole.19 This can
be concluded from recent figures published by the Fed (Table 9).
These figures show that the initial loss of reserves between December 2006
and December 2007 has been fully recovered in June 2008, and that the excess
reserves even increased. Note that the figures relate to all commercial banks
country-wide (around 9600), but that investment banks are not included.
The crisis raises the question whether the involvement of banks in the capi-
tal markets, specifically in the grey area of by themselves created new unlisted
investment products has gone too far and part of banks’ prosperity for that
reason should be considered as “artificial”, as a non-service to the economy.
A first answer to that question is that, anyhow, bank supervisors should get
18 See for a concise analysis of the bank crisis the annual report 2007 of DNB (2008, pp.
21–24).
19 Systemic risk raised acutely because the crisis was both fundamentals-based (the mortgage
crisis in the American home market after a series of interest rate increases) and contagion-
based (rumours on heavy sub-prime mortgage involvements of certain banks). Systemic risk
was already considered as being raised in the past decades by certain industry developments
like bank concentration and conglomeration. For the Netherlands see Minderhoud (2006). The
contagion element in the present crisis is new in the sense that the threat of contagious bank
failures is not induced by actual interbank debt positions of ailing banks but merely by market
rumours which impeded normal interbank financing.
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more grip on that grey area in their prudential supervision. Proposals to
amend Basel II are under consideration. But the crisis contains primarily a
serious warning to the bankers themselves to perform their main function,
namely the transformation of risk, more prudently than they recently did in
these newly developed activities. The mistakes they made can and should be
addressed by better, completely integrated internal risk information and risk
management systems, including better liquidity risk management. Bonus sys-
tems which inevitably undermine the prudent weighing of risk and reward
should be reconsidered. But the mistakes are not of a kind that banks should
stop altogether a search for new instruments and activities in the performance
of their risk transforming function. Risk transformation is and remains their
basic job. A recent report of McKinsey’s research staff underlines a positive
belief in the future of banking, concluding that banking was the most prof-
itable industry in the world in 2006 and predicting that, despite the present
crisis, banking will continue to grow faster than the world economy in the
coming ten years.20 This requires, however, that banks – especially the large,
internationally operating ones – regain the trust of the public at large and
consider consistent and trustworthy measures with that purpose as their top
priority. The present crisis has widely shaken confidence in the banking indus-
try as a whole.
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APPENDIX
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Chart 1 – UNITED STATES; Volatility calculated as a 12-month rolling standard deviation
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Chart 1 – continued
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Chart 2 – EUROPE
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